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UK Government Venture Capital (GVC) - backed schemes have evolved to provide 
more effective, targeted, funding for high growth potential firms. 
 
Public-private co-financing, is generating attributable, additional, positive 
employment and sales turnover impacts in beneficiary firms, but significant long 
horizon follow-on investment requirements need addressing. 
 
Policy designers should be cognisant of the changing external financing ecosystem 
when designing co-investment schemes. 
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Many of the most successful venture capital (VC) markets globally are catalysed by 
government support (Lerner, 2009, 2010, 2011). Since the global financial crisis 
(GFC), government VC (GVC) scheme investment has intensified. This has been 
driven by governments’ desire to support innovation, diversification and business 
growth (Lerner, 2010; Mazzucato and Penna, 2014; see UK BIS 2011, The Plan for 
Growth), by assisting potential growth businesses and enhancing the ‘Vital 6%’ of 
businesses that provide over half of all employment generation (Nesta, 2009). This 
has required addressing the broken seed and early stage finance escalator investment 
gaps created by retrenchment to later stage funding by bank debt and private VC 
finance (Cowling et al., 2012; North et al., 2013; Wilson and Silva, 2013). It also 
attempts to attract private investment, enhanced by increasing ability to attract foreign 
inward investment in the global information age (Hopp, 2010; Lerner, 2010; Lerner et 
al., 2005). 
Within Europe, Cumming et al (2014) highlight the huge deficit of VC investment 
when compared to the US (in 2010 European VC investment represented 0.03% of 
GDP, compared to 0.09% in the US), pointing out that this has led to far greater levels 
of GVC scheme development to compensate. Indeed, European GVC doubled to 
€1.6bn between 2007 and 2011, increasing its share from 9.9% to 39.1% of the VC 
market (EVCA, 2013). In the UK, since the Dotcom crisis, the proportion of 
government funding in seed and early stage VC increased (Murray, 2007). Mason and 
Pierrakis (2013) found a rise from 20% to 68% between 2000 and 2008. This trend 
has undoubtedly continued post GFC, given that British Venture Capital Association 
(BVCA, 2013) member seed and early stage VC investments in 2011 and 2012 were 
similar (£350m) to 1999, prior to the Dotcom bubble. This phenomenon alongside 
recent large-scale data which cast questions over the value of GVC schemes (Grilli 
and Murtinu, 2014; Munari and Toschi, 2015), makes it apposite to take a closer look 
at recent post GFC developments in the UK. 
In this paper we focus on GVC supply-side theories to assess scheme evolution and 
impact on the UK market, utilising a range of comparable early and mid-term 
assessments of the main UK GVC funds (GVCFs) operating in this period, namely the 
Enterprise Capital Funds (ECF), UK Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF) and Angel 
Co-investment Fund (ACF). All three GVCs are hybrid co-investment schemes 
(Murray, 2007), designed to encourage matching public-private sector investment, 
with the private sector taking the lead in portfolio business investment selection 
(Lerner, 2010), and to be complementary in addressing different aspects of the seed 
and early stage entrepreneurial finance market (Baldock and North, 2015; Mason and 
Baldock, 2015). In combination these three schemes have, since 2006 had capacity to 
invest upwards of £1.1bn1, directed towards seed and early stage UK innovative and 
potential high growth businesses.       
The paper initially summarises the theoretical context relating to the evolution and 
development of the UK’s main GVCs before outlining the methodology used in the 
assessments of the GVCs.  We then outline the key findings and consider the impact 
of the GVC schemes, before considering the implications for future research and 
policy development in conclusion.  
 
Underpinning theories of GVC development 
 
The main focus of this paper is supply side GVC theories, which relate to the rationale 
for government intervention in VC markets, addressing an equity gap and developing 
a VC ecosystem (Lerner’s 2010 vision of developing professional VC support 
services). This includes the related design and implementation of GVC schemes, 
addressing the fit for purpose question. Demand side theories relate to the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem and whether there is an adequate supply of suitable young 
investible potential high-growth businesses (Mason and Brown’s enterprise pipeline, 
2013). As Cumming et al. (2014) note, if demand and supply are not adequately met, 
schemes tend to fail, underlining the importance of GVC design and targeting 
implementation. 
Establishing a new UK finance escalator – overcoming escalator finance gaps 
 
The need for GVCs arises on account of the break-down of the so-called funding 
escalator (NESTA, 2009), a supply-side theoretical representation of the different 
types of entrepreneurial finance available to businesses as they progress from seed 
finance through the stages of development to trade sales or IPO2 (Deakins and Freel, 
2012). This adopts Berger and Udell’s (1998) entrepreneurial finance model 
explaining how the range of finance available to businesses changes and increases as 
they become less opaque and overcome information asymmetries with funders, 
demonstrating the importance of risk equity finance from business angels and VCs at 
the earlier funding stages. Mason and Baldock (2015), also adopt Myers and Majluf’s 
(1984) pecking order theory of entrepreneurial preferences for types of finance, 
suggesting that within equity finance, some entrepreneurs will prefer more 
personalised and tailored angel finance over the more formal and less intensive 
support of VC managers.  
Indeed, post-GFC the role of business angels as a source of early stage risk capital 
increased significantly within the UK and internationally (Wilson and Silva, 2013; 
OECD, 2011). There was no decline in business angel investment in the immediate 
                                                 
1 ECF’s (£850m UK government funding from three tranches – ongoing investing); UKIIF (£150m UK 
government funding matched by European Investment Fund and additional private funds – fully 
invested); ACF (£100mUK government funding – ongoing investing) 
2 Initial public offering (IPO) on a public equity market 
aftermath of the GFC, in marked contrast to trends in bank lending and venture capital 
investment (Mason and Harrison, 2015). This fundamentally damaged the, often 
critical, complementarity between business angel and VC funds, which, in turn, 
severely undermined the funding escalator (Gill, 2010; Mason et al. 2010) and 
necessitated angels to group together in order for follow-on investment to bridge the 
widening VC gap. Table 1 provides a summary of key trends, developed from 
Baldock and Mason (2015), which highlights the need for GVC intervention in the 
UK seed and early stage entrepreneurial finance markets, and notably to enable 
substantive capital investment for longer horizon R&D (Baldock et al. 2015) in order 
to facilitate a more fluid and efficient finance escalator. 
(INSET TABLE 1) 
 
Critique of GVCFs and emerging role of CIFs  
 
Co-investment Funds (CIFs) are a relatively recent public sector response to these 
structural changes in the supply of entrepreneurial finance, evolved during a period of 
increasing perceived need and reliance on government interventions world-wide 
(Murray, 2007; Mason and Pierrakis, 2013; Wilson and Silva, 2013) to address the 
seed and early stage funding gap post the Dot.com crisis (2001). The co-investment 
model is particularly welcome given the fluctuations in supply of venture capital over 
business cycles and financial market fluctuations (Gompers et al. 2008; Jeng and 
Wells, 2000). 
Agency failures (i) 
Very few GVCFs have been deemed successful (Brander et al. 2008; Lerner, 2009; 
Colombo et al. 2014). Many have experienced agency failures (Akerlof, 1976) leading 
to inadequate approaches to information asymmetries (e.g. ineffective due diligence) 
and policy implementation. This has occurred through too much government control 
with investment decisions made by bureaucrats rather than experts (Lerner, 2001), or 
insufficiently skilled local VC managers in the case of the UK Regional Development 
Funds in the 2000s (Munari and Toschi, 2014).  
A major finding of Lerner (2009; 2010), stemming from Israel’s Yozma funds 
transformation of Israel’s VC industry from 1993, was the importance of enabling 
private sector VC leadership and attracting leading, experienced fund managers 
internationally to take the lead on investment decisions (Baldock and North, 2015). 
Studies point to the importance of experienced hands-on private sector fund 
managers, indicating that successful VCs have niche “hard to imitate” knowledge of 
sectors and stages (BIS, 2011) and are persistent performers who build on their 
experience over time (Gompers et al. 2010; Zarutskie, 2010). This argument can be 
extended to the key role of experienced business angels in leading angel investment 
groups (Mason and Harrison, 2015).  
Murray (2007) describes the development of private VC led CIFs as ‘hybrid funds’, 
where government provides a proportion of funding to lever matched funding from 
private VCs; as adopted by the New Zealand Venture Investment Fund (NZIF) in 
2002 and UK’s Enterprise Capital Funds (ECF) in 2006 (Baldock and Mason, 2015). 
For the NZVIF this involved at least a 50% matching for up to NZ$25m, whilst for 
ECFs a minimum of one-third matching funds was available for up to £25m of 
government funding3. Lerner (2010) also notes the importance of providing private 
investor incentives to encourage private funding leverage into deals. These can be 
generated directly through scheme upside investment returns (e.g. UK ECFs4), or 
through indirect tax breaks such as the UK’s Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme 
(SEIS)5 for angel investors (Baldock and Mason, 2015).  
Whilst Lerner (2010) indicates GVCFs with private VC manager portfolio investment 
improves targeting into viable businesses, he recognises that investments require 
regular monitoring to avoid market distortion and duplication (Leleux and Surlemont, 
2003).  
 
Design theories (ii) 
 
Mounting evidence has also led to key GVCF design theories (Baldock, 2016). First, 
Lerner (2010), Technopolis (2011), Cumming et al. (2013) and Baldock and North 
(2015) recognise that funds require sufficient size, scale and range. Small-scale, 
regional and sector specific funds often fail to find sufficient high quality investments, 
or have insufficient funding for follow-on investments into their better performing 
portfolio companies. This leads to a failure to achieve Markowitz (1952) optimal VC 
portfolio fund size and follow-on investment to keep their best portfolio firms to a 
point of optimal exit, typically via trade sale or IPO (Cumming at el. 2013).  
 
Second, Lerner (2010) highlighted Yozma’s 10 year restricted Limited Partnership 
funds as encouraging a cycle of dynamic fund investment and return redistribution 
into new funds, overcoming the potential for mission creep and poor incentive to 
deliver returns experienced by evergreen public VC schemes (e.g. Murray et al. 2009, 
GVCFs in Finland). However, investment horizons for early stage investments to 
reach exit, notably post-GFC, have doubled from four to eight years on average 
between 2000 and 2015 (Mason and Harrison, 2015; Waddell, 2013; Axelson and 
Martinovic, 2012), requiring flexible ‘long game’ thinking in relation to VC 
programme length (Lerner, 2010)6.  
 
Thirdly, this has brought into sharper focus the need for second fund financing 
rotation (Baldock, 2016; Dittmer et al., 2014), or to revisit evergreen funding options 
(Baldock and Mason, 2015 e.g. through deal-based CIFs).  
 
                                                 
3 Since the EU raised the state aid threshold in January 2014, ECFs can now offer up to £50m in public 
funding. 
4 ECF public sector returns are currently capped at 3%.  
5 A parallel Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) also operates in the UK for larger SMEs with under 
250 employees and £15m assets. 
6 For example, the UK ECFs are 10 year LPs, which the private fund managers can request to extend to 
12 years  
Finally, Hopp (2010) and Baldock (2016) introduce VC management practice as a 
way of smoothing portfolio company funding continuity through improved 
syndication between VCs and angel groups, notably in developing international 
investment and market opportunities.  From the business angels’ perspective, Botelho 
(2015) develops Wenger et al. (2002) communities of practice theory, suggesting that 
angel group and syndication investment can enable diffusion of best practice angel 
investment, raising investment quality and improving ability to syndicate, follow-on 
fund and successfully exit.  
                 
The emerging role of Angel-Oriented CIFs (A-OCIFs) 
 
CIFs have evolved into two distinct government matching funding categories: private 
VC managers (discussed above); and individual private investor (business angel or 
VC) deals, as in the case of the ACF.  
 
CIFs emerged from the early 2000s, focusing on providing government funding which 
could be matched to individual business investment deals. Many, such as the 
pioneering Scottish Co-investment Fund and New Zealand Seed Co-investment Fund, 
primarily operate with business angels in responding to the early stage funding gap 
vacated by private VCs during this period (Murray, 2007; Mason and Pierrakis, 
2013). A-OCIFs are typically evergreen in design, working on a revolving fund 
principle of reinvesting returns. In the post-GFC economic environment with 
increased investment exit timetables, the greater flexibility afforded to the evergreen 
ACF is considered by industry experts (BVCA, UKBAA, EIF7) to be a considerable 
advantage (Baldock and Mason, 2015). Wilson and Silva (2013), along with EBAN 
(2012) and OECD (2011) reviews, indicate a small, growing number of A-OCIFs 
dedicated to angel investment operate at national and regional scales. They have 
several common features, typically investing up to a maximum of half the total 
investment in the business with an upper limit to the size of its investment under the 
EU state aid limit of £2m, matching funding on a like for like pari passu basis (i.e. 
with no direct private sector return incentive). An important contrast between A-
OCIFs is whether they guarantee to match funds to approved investors, as in the case 
of the Scottish CIF, or assess each investment on a case by case basis, as in the case of 
the ACF’s independent Investment Committee, which draws on a mix of experienced 
angel and institutional fund managers.    
 
A-OCIFs appear to have significantly increased the volume of investment activity in 
the early stage equity market, enabling angels to participate in larger deals than 
otherwise possible (UKBAA, 2013; Hayton, 2008). However, they have limitations. 
First, like other GVCs, they are constrained by the supply of investable businesses, 
particularly in small regions. This can be overcome by operating at a national scale 
and across a wide range of sectors to ensure sufficient viable investible businesses can 
be found, and could include investing pan nationally, as in the case of some VC-led 
CIFs such as UKIIF (Baldock and Mason, 2015; Dittmer et al. 2014). Second, they 
require organised angel groups to partner to provide efficient gateways for collective 
angel funding into the schemes (Harrison and Mason, 2015). This limits their role in 
regions with undeveloped angel markets, or dominated by angels investing 
individually or in ad hoc groups. Therefore, abolition of the English Regional 
                                                 
7 British Venture Capital Association (BVCA), UK Business Angel Association (UKBAA) and European Investment 
Fund (EIF) representatives all supported evergreen approaches in January 2014 
Development Agencies (RDAs) in 2012, which funded regional BAN development, 
may undermine the regional coverage of the UK ACF.  
 
The recent emergence of managed angel groups – angels who invest together rather 
than as individuals or small ad hoc groups – has therefore been critical for the 
establishment of A-OCIFs, and notably in Scotland (Mason and Harrison, 2015). 
They emerged in response to VC funds withdrawal from the early stage market, which 
required angels to make larger investments and follow-on investments in a context 
where investment exit timetables were doubling (Axelson and Martinovic, 2012; 
Waddell, 2013). Now some larger angel groups make multiple rounds of funding, 
enabling businesses to exit without raising follow-on investment from VCs. 
Additionally, angels benefit from working together, by improving deal flow, superior 
evaluation and due diligence of investment opportunities, diversification and broader 
skills base to provide smart money hands-on assistance to investee businesses. This 
extends VC agency theory, highlighting the importance of experienced lead angel 
investor skills (to select viable investments and undertake due diligence) and their 
skills diffusion into the angel investor group base, potentially raising investment 
standards through communities of practice (Botelho, 2015; Mason and Harrison, 
2015).  
 
Despite their growth, there has been relatively little policy evaluation of CIFs. 
Moreover, the demand-side is often overlooked in such evaluations (Wilson and 
Silver, 2013). The recent study of UK GVCFs by Munari and Toschi (2014) focusing 
on fund exits as a barometer of success, highlighted the problems of fund evaluation, 
whilst Baldock and Mason (2015) and Baldock (2016) note that it is even more 
difficult to evaluate funds at an early stage, prior to exits.  
 
However, as Lerner (2010) suggests, early stage evaluations are about addressing 
agency and programme design and delivery issues to refine schemes, ensuring that 
they are operating efficiently in addressing a market gap, demonstrating additionality, 
avoiding duplication and displacement and avoiding mission creep. At the early stage, 
therefore, focus should be on scheme processes such as promotional visibility and 
accessibility (including timelines to accessing finance), additionality and spillover 
measurements (Baldock, 2016; Baldock and Mason, 2015) and assessments of 
displacement (Lerner, 2010) between public funds and crowding out of the private 
sector (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003). Lerner (2010) also highlights the importance of 
establishing a well networked VC support services system (e.g. accountants, 
solicitors, advisors, referrers8), whilst Wilson and Silva (2013) find that A-OCIFs 
give little consideration to investor training which, given the importance of their 
working with organised angel groups, may form an important agency related policy 
consideration.           
 
 
ECF, UKIIF and ACF in context 
 
Enterprise Capital Funds (ECFs) 
 
                                                 
8 DETI (2015) The Future of Early and Growth Stage Finance in Northern Ireland study found that 
many finance intermediaries were under informed about GVCFs. 
Enterprise Capital Funds (ECFs) are a rolling £840m programme of 26 funds9 
established since 2006, with a planned 10‒12 year individual fund life cycle, 
addressing the equity gap facing high growth potential SMEs (Table 2). Government 
funding is used alongside private sector funds to invest directly into businesses, 
targeting investments of up to £2m with potential to provide a good commercial 
return. Here we focus on the first two tranches of fifteen ECFs operating under private 
sector VC fund management, with funds ranging from £10m to £30m. These ECFs 
focused on different stages of business development, typically early stage and 
including specialist seed (Passion Capital) and expansion funds (Catapult). Some 
were generalist, covering a broad range of sectors (Seraphim Capital Fund), while 
others specialized for example in new media (Dawn Capital Fund) and medical and 
healthcare investments (Oxford Technology Management Fund), reflecting the areas 
of fund management expertise. 
UK Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF) 
The UK Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF), established in 2010, aimed to stimulate 
private VC investment into intensive R&D sectors (Table 2). The £150m of UK 
government funding was matched by a further £180m of public and private funding 
from two ‘fund of funds’ managed by the Hermes Environmental Innovation Fund 
and the European Investment Fund’s UK Technologies Fund. UKIIF operates pari 
passu at arms’ length under the scrutiny of the British Business Bank10. As it is 
private sector led and can invest in innovative businesses globally, there are no 
European Union (EU) state aid restrictions on the size of initial or follow on 
investments. The fund focuses on life sciences, cleantech, digital technology and 
advanced manufacturing sectors and must invest at least £150m into UK based 
businesses during its expected 12‒15 year life cycle. 
Angel Co-investment Fund (ACF) 
 
The UK government’s £100m11 Angel Co-investment Fund (ACF), launched 
November 2011, invests between £100,000 and £1m in SMEs alongside syndicates of 
at least three business angels12 (Table 2). Lead angels from the syndicates are required 
to bring cases they wish to invest in, but require further funding for, to the scheme. 
Qualifying SMEs must have under 250 employees, €50m annual sales turnover and 
€43m of assets on their balance sheet13. All sectors are eligible, with investments 
addressing the current equity finance gap for early stage, potential high growth firms. 
The ACF is evergreen, with reinvested investment returns enabling its perpetual 
operation. Initially, restricted to England, following Parliamentary Assent in Spring 
2014, it has a UK-wide investment mandate. At the time of our assessment (February, 
2014) 39 ACF investments were in England.  
 
                                                 
9 In Spring 2018 - includes the Catalyst Fund which tops up multiple private funds to enable fund 
raising closure. 
10 Prior to the British Business Bank being formed in 2014, Capital for Enterprise Ltd (CfEL) was the 
UK government’s body overseeing its equity programmes. 
11 The ACF initially received a £50m Regional Growth Fund endowment with returns being recycled, 
doubling to £100m in July 2013 through a British Business Bank 15 year term non-subordinated loan. 
12 Specifically, matching business angel funding in the £200,000 to £2m range, although total round 
sizes, including all investors can be larger.  
13 Complying with European Union state aid requirements for SMEs 
The ACF operates as a private company limited by guarantee, at arm’s length from 
Government with British Business Bank oversight14. It is not involved in investment 
decisions, which are made by an independent Investment Committee (IC) of private 
angels and institutional investors, based on a view of a business proposition paper and 
telephone interview with the lead angel. It can contribute a maximum 49% of deal 
investment, typically averaging 25%-30%, with the maximum permissable company 
shareholding being 30%. Investments are pari passu on equal terms with private 
investors. After 26 months, £67m had been invested into 39 companies and nine 
follow-on investments, including over £13.75m from the ACF15. 
 
 





Following our review of GVCF agency and design theories and the specific roles of 
the three main UK schemes in addressing the broken post GFC finance escalator, we 
examine the following research questions: 
 
1. Are schemes meeting specific gaps in the UK entrepreneurial finance market? 
Finance escalator theory suggest there is a gap requiring specific types of 
GVC scheme interventions, notably early stage and long horizon R&D 
investment (Baldock, 2016). 
2. Are schemes adding value and avoiding duplication or crowding out of the 
private sector (Lerner, 2010, Leleux and Surlemont, 2003)?   
3. What early stage economic impacts are the schemes making? What evidence 
is there to support Lerner’s (2010) contention that GVCFs can make a 
difference to business growth and innovation?  
4. How well adjusted are schemes to the lengthening exit timetables experienced 
post GFC (Axelson and Martinovic, 2012)? Do they have the flexibility and 
follow on funding capability (Cumming, 2011) which Lerner (2010) advocates 
for long game investment? 
5. Do schemes have the size and scale to make a lasting legacy impact on the 
early stage entrepreneurial finance market in the UK? Lerner’s (2010) ultimate 






                                                 
14 The Board comprises the original bid partner organisations: Oxford Investment Opportunity 
Network, Braveheart Investment Group Ltd, Octopus Investments, Hotspur Capital Partners. 
15 ACF Presentation to UKBAA, London 29/01/2014 At the end of 2015 (Real Business, 04/04/2016) 
indicated 59 company investments with average ACF first investments of £345k and overall funding 
round investment of £1.4m (£82.6m in total associated round funding), including 35 follow-on 
investments. The ACF has so far invested £27.5m of its own funds with an average share contribution 
of 33%. http://realbusiness.co.uk/article/33464-exclusive-these-numbers-show-uk-angels-are-
providing-stairway-to-entrepreneurial-heaven    
This paper draws on a mixed methods approach (Creswell, 2003), seeking to 
triangulate and confirm data from a range of sources. Findings are derived from 
primary demand and supply side evidence, drawn from semi-structured interviews 
undertaken face to face and by telephone with the CEOs and CFOs (chief executives 
and finance officers) of GVCF assisted businesses (alongside some policy-off 
counterfactual interviews with businesses that applied, but were unassisted). 
Additionally, there were interviews with 19 lead business angel applicants (16 
successful and five unsuccessful16) to the ACF scheme. 
 
Supply side evidence comes from interviews with 16 fund managers and three ACF 
Investment Committee (IC) members who dealt with GVCF applications, alongside 
16 interviews with alternative private investors and 6 interviews with finance industry 
experts drawn from trade associations, trade news, private VCs, angel capital groups, 
accelerators and equity crowd funding platforms (not directly linked to the focus 
GVCFs), SME finance support organisations and relevant funding bodies (Table 4). 
Whilst our sample size is relatively small, our methodology provides rich data and 
unique insights into the role and operation of GVCs in the UK from all participants. 
Our novel approach affords a comprehensive assessment and analysis of recent UK 
experience in the operation of GVCs. 
Business manager interviews 
The owner-managers of 43 successful business applicants to the three GVCF schemes 
were interviewed face-to-face or by telephone, with purposive selection to provide 
sector and UK-wide coverage presented one third of the schemes’ funded businesses 
(43/135) at the time of survey (Table 3)17. Initial interviews were undertaken for ECF 
in February 2010, UKIIF in February 2012 and ACF in February 2014. Survey 
questions were broadly aligned across the schemes and included business 
characteristics, external financing requirements and knowledge, degree of success in 
obtaining external finance, terms and conditions, and the impact and additionality 
experienced and forecast from the funding received. Further follow up telephone 
interviews took place with 24 of the ECF and UKIIF recipient businesses in May 
2013 to assess development since the initial funding. 
(INSERT TABLE 3) 
Survey survival bias and scheme additionality are critical to scheme assessment 
(Baldock, 2016). However, for early assessments the focus should be on scheme 
additionality and minor adjustment to ensure that schemes are meeting their 
operational aims (Lerner, 2010), since even at mid–term assessment it remains 
notoriously difficult to evaluate scheme impact (Baldock and Mason, 2015) as the 
better performing businesses often exit far later in the cycle of the fund (Wiltbank, 
                                                 
16 A couple of lead angels had multiple ACF applications, including successful and unsuccessful ones.   
17 Mann-Whitney tests two-tailed ‘U’ tests revealed no significant differences between the purposive 
survey samples and overall scheme assisted business samples in terms of sector and location 
distribution, the only exception being at .05 level (Z-score: -2.305, p=0.02088 and U-value of 9.5 
where critical value is 13) for the ACF survey, which is explained by under representation of online 
services, including retail, lettings and fashion activities. Exclusion of this sector leads to U-value of 
8.5, at above the critical value of 8.   
2005). We therefore focus on comparisons with policy-off applicants’ performance 
(five ECF and 4 ACF applicant companies) and longitudinal interviews with 
surviving ECF (8) and UKIIF (14) investee companies that were available to be 
interviewed within the timeframe of the follow-up short telephone interview research 
with CEO/CFOs in May 2013.       
Fund Provider Interviews 
Face-to-face interviews were undertaken with eight UKIIF5 and eight ECF fund 
managers and three ACF Investment Committee members (the independent expert 
investors who select scheme investments), alongside a comprehensive two hour 
induction meeting and ongoing information from the ACF administration team at the 
British Business Bank. These semi-structured face to face and telephone interviews, 
supplemented by scheme administrative and review documentation provided insights 
into their structure and operation, the type and range of applications, decision-making 
criteria, the effectiveness of their investments and assessment of whether funds were 
addressing an equity gap. These represented all of the programmes’ operational funds 
at the time of survey (Table 4). 
(INSERT TABLE 4)  
To enrich our understanding of the new and early stage VC market, interviews were 
also conducted with 22 expert informants (detailed in Table 4). These were also 
broadly aligned to explore issues around the perceived equity finance gap for seed and 
early stage innovative and potential high growth UK companies. We also investigated 
the complementarity, added value or duplication of schemes, and their likely impact 
on developing a new post GFC UK finance escalator and creating a lasting legacy on 




Are schemes addressing early stage finance gaps? 
 
The surveyed businesses fitted each scheme’s target profile, typically being young, 
early stage businesses established since 2000. Over half of recipients were pre-trading 
at the time of interview, undertaking R&D and developing prototypes or in the initial 
stages of launching products and services. Most, including all 16 UKIIF businesses, 
were undertaking market leading activities, developing leading edge software, 
medical and low carbon technologies, and demonstrating global market leading export 
aspirations.  
Equity finance was perceived as the only viable option for raising finance due to a 
lack of financial assets, insufficient trading record, and owners’ unwillingness to 
secure/guarantee debt finance against private property. Funds were mainly being 
sought for later stage R&D and market testing, and this frequently involved hiring 
specialist technical staff for software development, and also sales and service support 
teams, with product prototype manufacture typically being subcontracted out. The 
amount of equity sought by the 12 interviewed ECF recipients ranged from £300,000 
to £3m (median £750,000) and typically involved first round VC funding. The 15 
ACF recipients initially sought between £260,000 to £2.3m (median £880,000), often 
entailing second round angel funding to levels that stretched well beyond the 
£500,000 (UKBAA, 2013) limit of contemporary angel syndicate deals. It is notable 
that ACF investments are skewed towards shorter horizon digitech solutions with 
software, gaming, online and financial services representing over half of the 
investments, and this has perhaps been influenced by UK investor taxbreak policy18. 
The 16 UKIIF recipients sought between £75,000 and £10.4m (median £2.4m), 
demonstrating demand for early stage longer horizon R&D equity finance at beyond 
the EU state aid cap of £2m at the time of funding19, supporting the Rowlands gap 
(2009) hypothesis and subsequent findings of Baldock et al (2015). 
The majority of businesses were small when funded (Table 6). ECF and ACF 
recipients had mean employment size of 9.5 and 11 respectively (medians of 4 and 5 
employees). UKIIF recipients had a mean size of 38 employees (median 11) and 
included three established medium sized businesses undertaking new innovative 
product development cycles, including a recycling company diversifying into bio fuel 
production and a lightweight plastics manufacturer, both with over 150 employees; 
the latter being effectively subject to a new company management buy-in to facilitate 
new technological advanced manufacturing. 
Are schemes adding value or crowding out? 
Leleux and Surlemont (2003) underline the importance of ascertaining the level of 
funding duplication existing between public or private funding opportunities. Overall 
there was little or no evidence from the management surveys of funding duplication 
either between public funding, or in crowding out private funding (see additionality 
measures below), particularly as the businesses “required funding within certain time 
parameters, crucially in order to retain market primacy”, typically within a 6-12 
months period (Baldock and Mason, 2015).  For example, half of the ECF and 
virtually all of the UKIIF cases had sought other forms of external finance, mainly 
from private VCs, and in some more mature trading cases from banks, but few had 
received offers, due to their being “too early stage for private VCs” and being told to 
“come back when the company has several years market traction”. In the case of the 
ACF, these businesses typically had existing angel investors and their first preference 
was to seek further angel investment – a pre-requisite of the scheme. 
 
Survey findings revealed an intriguing dichotomy between managers with pecking 
order preferences for VC and the simplicity of raising finance from few or single 
sources of private sector investor. The latter is to “avoid fragmented, complex and 
time consuming angel funding arrangements” and therefore they sought ECF or 
UKIIF funding, which in many cases was deemed to be “seeking far more funding 
than angels could be expected to deliver”.  Conversely, there were managers who 
preferred “the hands-on intensive business management support of angels” and felt 
that they would be “less controlling and less likely to take the business out of their 
hands.”  The three schemes, therefore, appear to apply to three distinctively different 
market gaps, although there was evidence from the ACF that the larger series A 
funding rounds could include syndication with private VC. This underlines Hopp’s 
                                                 
18 The UK Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) encouraging private high net worth investors to invest 
in SMEs, offers maximum tax breaks after only three years of investment (HMRC, 22/10/2013). 
19 Prior to raising of the EU state aid cap in January 2014 
(2010) contention that this can increase round sizes, improve follow-on funding 
opportunities, market development (notably where VCs have niche export market 
skills), and more optimal investment exits. All factors that were mentioned by 
surveyed scheme assisted managers.  
 
None of the schemes have a particular remit to generate additional private sector 
investment leverage. However, it is evident that each scheme was levering 
attributable20 additional private sector matching funding into the GVCF assisted 
rounds. This typically represented leverage of 50 pence private funding for every £1 
of public investment.   
 
In the less than one in ten cases where alternative funding was rejected, this was 
mainly because the funding available was insufficient or in some cases because 
“corporate VC is too restrictive in terms of product and market development” and had 
“nothing to do with the cost of the finance and everything to do with the compatibility 
of the fund manager”. This underlines pecking order preferences and what Baldock et 
al. (2015) refer to as the necessary meeting of minds between managers and investors 
in equity investment, particularly in respect of industry sector and stage of 
development.  
Additionality is measured from the CEOs’ judgment of the counterfactual policy-off 
scenario21 and triangulated with assessments from fund managers and investing 
angels. A clear finding across all schemes is that financial additionality is judged 
considerably lower than project additionality, particularly in the case of UKIIF where 
over two-thirds of respondents felt that they would be able to raise all of the funding 
required without the availability of the scheme (Table 4). Triangulation of financial 
additionality findings with the views of fund managers reveals that surveyed business 
managers typically overestimate their abilities to raise funding, although it was clear 
from the UKIIF fund managers that they were selecting investee companies “to 
maximise investor returns and perform within the upper quartile of VC funds”. This 
suggests that they were not applying the same economic development criteria to fund 
Oakey’s (2003) probably fundable businesses, as opposed to the definitely fundable 
and potentially contributing to private sector crowding out (Leleux and Surlemont, 
2003). However, it is clear from the project additionality that only between one fifth 
to a quarter of business managers believed that they would have gone ahead with the 
project on the same time and size scales. This is an important factor, as faster delivery 
of investment can preserve market primacy (Baldock and Mason, 2015). Therefore, 
the traditional notion of crowding out needs to take on board funding timeframes, 
particularly given their lengthening timescales recorded in the post GFC period 
(Baldock and North, 2015).   
(INSERT TABLE 5)  
A further indicator of funding additionality is to examine policy-off ‘dead deal’ cases 
where GVC funds were not provided, ostensibly because the business case was either 
rejected at a late stage in the application process, or terms were not able to be agreed 
                                                 
20 Where the surveyed manager indicated that the additional private funding was directly attributable to 
obtaining the GVCF funding.  
21 Adopting standard BIS protocols for the Early Assessment of Equity Schemes (2010), UKIIF (2012) 
and ACF (2014 unpublished). 
by the applicant business. Four ACF and five ECF dead deals were examined, 
matching these with the timing of the initial survey of successful applicants and 
across similar broad sectors. Although only a small-scale qualitative sample, the 
findings are highly supportive of scheme additonality, with all of the businesses 
taking longer to obtain funding and in several cases failing altogether. Only one 
business subsequently performed better than expected and that was due to changing 
international export market focus, which proved highly successful. All of the 
remaining businesses subsequently performed less well than the assisted survey 
sample and three had ceased trading.  
What are the initial scheme impacts? 
As Baldock (2016) and Baldock and Mason (2015) suggest, early scheme assessments 
are notoriously problematic when assessing the potential outcomes of investments and 
fund performance, notably because of the extending post GFC exit horizons (Axelson 
and Martinovic, 2012) and the propensity for better performing plum investments to 
take longer to mature (Wiltbank, 2005). However, it is possible to examine the initial 
economic development impacts of funding, in terms of investee business performance 
and economic multipliers/spill-overs (Baldock, 2016). Focusing on assisted 
businesses that had received funding at least one year prior to initial survey, it is 
evident that each scheme exhibits proportional net increases in employment and sales 
turnover (Table 6). The more mature, typically larger UKIIF businesses exhibited 
greatest sales increase, with ECF and UKIIF businesses doubling their employment. 
Projecting forward, forecasts for ECF and ACF demonstrate similarly optimistic 
median sales growth over the next year of £600,000 and £830,000 respectively. 
However, when examining longitudinal survey results for the surveyed surviving ECF 
(7) and UKIIF (12) assisted businesses, we find the reality is far less rosy, with 
median sales increasing by £380,000 over three years for ECF and £200,000 over one 
year for UKIIF businesses. This demonstrates the impacts of the GFC recession in 
slowing down growth and in the case of the ECFs, some “difficulties accessing the 
follow-on financing rounds required to maintain development trajectory momentum.”  
On a more positive note, employment generation was more consistent, with ECFs 
increasing from a median of 10 to 26 employees over the three years of the 
longitudinal survey (+160%), whilst UKIIF increased from 20 to 35 employees in just 
one year (+75%).  
(INSERT TABLE 6)  
Some additional calculations were also undertaken for the ECF and ACF assisted 
businesses to more accurately attribute the direct impact of the respective GVC 
funding on assisted businesses, suggesting that this was catalytic. Managers estimate 
that each scheme contributed around 10% more to recorded post funding business 
growth outcomes than the proportion of government investment received in the 
overall funding round, a finding which provides weak support for the schemes’ ability 
to leverage other funds (Baldock ad Mason, 2015).   
Taking a broader economic development view (Baldock, 2016), these schemes appear 
to offer considerable assistance to business development. This occurs through 
management assistance from fund managers, or their appointed board members who 
fulfil expert managerial roles (e.g. financial management, sales and marketing) and in 
the case of seed VCs and lead business angels, highly specialist, intensive hands-on 
investor support (Gompers et al. 2010; Mason and Harrison, 2015). It was noted by 
both managers and investors that the improved management structures and business 
operations imposed by VC and angel investors can “improve business performance 
and also enhance opportunities for follow-on funding”. These findings have been 
strongly supported by the recent study of Baldock and Mason (2015) which found that 
93% of managers from 75 surviving ECF assisted businesses reported improved 
management practices22. The present qualitative study finds considerable evidence 
that Baldock et al.’s (2015) meeting of minds (between investors and managers) was a 
crucial element in adding value to business performance (Manigart and Wright, 2013; 
Clarysse et al., 2011). Many of the surveyed UKIIF managers that were at early 
market growth stages highlight that their VC managers had been “excellent in opening 
up market opportunities and assisting with successfully negotiating complex and 
daunting export market opportunities” (Lockett et al. 2008). In some cases this occurs 
through syndication with other overseas VCs (Hopp, 2010) with specialist market 
knowledge which could “overcome technical market barriers, establish sales offices 
and develop customer links.”    
More specifically, it is clear that many of the assisted businesses subcontract out 
work, particularly manufacturing, but also technical support (e.g. specialist software, 
technical components, sales and marketing) in cases where it is not practical or 
possible to recruit appropriate staff. The Baldock and Mason (2015) study found that 
ECF assisted businesses created considerable subcontract employment opportunities, 
estimated at creating 2.7 extra jobs per assisted company, with many of these 
undertaken elsewhere in the UK. Similarly, our ACF study found that two thirds of 
the 15 assisted businesses subcontracted work out, with a median of five jobs created 
and an average across the businesses of 3.3 jobs. Our studies of ECF and ACF also 
demonstrated that the vast majority of assisted businesses had raised their levels of 
innovation. ECF recipients exhibited high proportions improving products, 
services, marketing and business processes (all 75% or higher), whilst over half of the 
ACF firms had introduced new or improved patents and copyrights. 
 
Finally, a strong contention of Herriott (2011) is that an important spillover impact of 
scheme investment is vestigial, pertaining to the residual ongoing impacts of failed 
businesses. Our study reviewed the outcomes from a small number of failed 
businesses (2 ACF and 5 ECF). A common factor in business failure was found to be 
the breakdown of the relationship between the investor and investee company 
management teams, and the collapse of the meeting of minds (Baldock et al. 2015). 
However, there was considerable evidence from the failed managers of spillover 
impacts which included two businesses being re-established and successfully trading. 
Several managers finding niche managerial roles in other companies in associated 
sector activities where their skills were adding value to these businesses and several 
instances of IP being held which might have future value. 
 
Exit plans, follow-on funding and scheme adjustments      
 
One of the most demanding requirements of GVCF scheme design and operation in 
recent years, notably post GFC (Baldock, 2016) has been the telescoping of 
                                                 
22 A survey commissioned by BIS, undertaken in February 2014. 
investment exit timetables (Axelson and Martinovic, 2013; Waddell, 2013). This 
occurs through a combination of businesses taking longer to complete R&D due to 
shortages of funding and the requirements for more mature market traction to achieve 
successful IPOs or trade sales (Baldock, 2015). Therefore, there is a need for scheme 
flexibility to plan for the long game (Lerner, 2010).   
 
Our longitudinal research of ECF and UKIIF underlines the above trends. Table 7 
demonstrates that at the time of the initial early assessment survey, typically one year 
after funding, approximately one fifth of assisted businesses were slipping behind 
their planned development schedules. Our ACF study in 2014 indicates one third were 
already behind schedule. However, when we look at the longitudinal performance, we 
find that a further year on UKIIF businesses have slipped back (from 15% to 28% 
being behind schedule). Three years further on the majority of surveyed ECFs have 
fallen behind schedule, resulting in a median rise of 1.5 years in their estimated exit 
timetables (rising from 5 to 6.5 years). Another trend, which is evident in the post 
GFC period is the move away from IPO, due to “lack of liquidity and uncertainties in 
the public equity market to raise sufficient funds to justify this type of exit” (Baldock, 
2015). Again, our more recent ACF research, during a period when the UK AIM 
public feeder market for early stage businesses was starting to recover in 2014, found 
that only one fifth of surveyed managers favoured IPO exits, suggesting continued 
uncertainties around public equity markets. 
 
(INSET TABLE 7) 
 
An important consequence of these findings for time limited LP23 funds, such as the 
ECFs and UKIIF underlying funds, is whether their lifespans and funding scales are 
sufficient to maintain and invest in their longer term plum portfolio companies 
(Wilbank, 2005) for long enough to enable them to reach optimal exit (Markovitz, 
1952). Cumming (2011) has impressed on the importance of VC funds being able to 
maintain and grow their best portfolio businesses. Our interviews with ECF and 
UKIIF fund managers indicated that the smaller ECF funds with shorter lifespans (10-
12 years) were under increasing pressures to make substantial follow-on funding 
(typically as part of rounds valued at over £2m) and to reach satisfactory investment 
exit points within 10 years. The vast majority of ECF fund managers indicated that 
they would be applying for the full two year extensions to their funds. Some also 
complained that they had insufficient funds, or were too restricted in their ability to 
fund individual portfolio businesses under the pre-2014 EU state aid restrictions24.  
For some earlier stage seed VCs, there was recognition that they would syndicate with 
specialist later stage VCs to enable and relinquish their lead investor role (Hopp, 
2010; Baldock, 2016). However, other VCs were more concerned about their ability 
to form second funds within a circa five year cycle, which would enable them to 
follow-on fund their portfolio businesses (Baldock, 2016). It is notable that few (3 
ECF funds out of 15) had successfully applied for second funds and that these were 
taking longer than five years to achieve.  
 
                                                 
23 Limited Partnership (LP) funds are the typical legal formation of VC in the UK , typically with 10 
year lifespans. 
24 The 10% funding rule effectively restricted most funds to between £3-4m investment in any one of 
their portfolio businesses.  
With regard to UKIIF, these longer timescale funds (12-15 years) designed to support 
long horizon R&D sectors were, at the time of interview, less pressured. However, 
there was recognition amongst surveyed fund managers of the likely large-scale of 
follow-on funding requirements and that these might well involve specialist 
syndication (e.g. DFJ Esprit’s connections with specialist US market VCs). However, 
some managers were also more reticent about potentially relinquishing their lead 
share through VC syndication, which might hold back follow-on funding in some 
cases (Baldock and North, 2016).  
 
The ACF is an evergreen fund and was particularly favoured by the industry experts 
interviewed as having the scale and flexibility to meet the follow-on funding 
requirements of its portfolio businesses. More recent evidence from Real Business 
(2016) suggests that the scheme is following its aim of retaining 50% investment for 
follow on funding with 59 portfolio company investments undertaken by December 
2015 and 35 follow-on investments completed. The scale of overall investment from 
the fund is typically £1.4m, requiring at least a 51% match from angels and other 
investors. Conversely, we surveyed one failed ACF business which had not received 
follow-on funding and, whilst it is not possible to obtain the scheme’s determinants 
for rejection, the investing angel and business manager were both of the view that the 
failure to obtain follow-on funding – which would have unlocked other substantial 
private investment - was the main reason for business failure.  
 
 
Discussion of market impacts 
 
A critical role of UK GVCFs has been to act as demonstrators (ECFs) and encourage 
higher quality private investment, whether angels (ACF) or specialist niche sector 
VCs (UKIIF) within the UK and develop the seed and early stage market and its 
associated support infrastructure, following Lerner’s (2010) principles. The question 
after nearly 10 years of the ECFs, six years of the UKIIF and four years of the ACF, is 
to what extent are these schemes making an impact on the market and, in the case of 
ECF’s, leaving a Lerner-type legacy?  
 
The first point, unanimously mentioned by fund managers and industry experts, is that 
it is far too early to tell – even in the case of the ECFs, particularly give the period of 
financial stress that that the UK market has undergone during and after the GFC. 
Lerner’s (2010) long game view is critical, as there have not been sufficient exits to 
raise the profile of the funds and provide clear indication of their likely performance. 
Furthermore, as Baldock (2016) and Baldock and Mason (2015) found, it is not 
helpful to compare GVCFs with private VCs, given that they are often not operating 
in the same investment space (i.e. private VCs are often investing at later, less risky 
stages) and that the economic development aims of GVCFs may inevitably mean that 
they underperform private VCs (Rigos, 2010; Oakey, 2003). As Baldock (2016) also 
argues, recent UK and European studies comparing GVCFs with private VC 
performance are of old style funds (e.g. UK Regional Development Funds), with poor 
designs, small-scale and poor management, and not reflective of the more recent 
private sector led co-investment models exemplified by the three UK schemes in this 
study. What is clear from our findings is that these schemes are operating in different 
markets, addressing clear equity finance gaps – so not demonstrating private sector 
crowding out - and are complementing rather than competing against each other in 
forming the new UK post GFC finance escalator for early stage entrepreneurial 
finance (Baldock and Mason, 2015). 
 
That said, our study highlights a number of critical issues around scheme design that 
will require attention and adjustments, in order to achieve a more optimal 
performance. Triangulating findings from the respective business surveys, fund 
manager, scheme administrator meetings and assorted industry experts, it is clear that 
meeting the follow-on funding ‘series A-B’ scale funding is critical to maintaining 
portfolio business development trajectories and associated market primacy objectives 
of what are essentially highly innovative and market leading businesses with high 
growth potential. Most experts agree that funds require scale, which suggests that the 
original eight pathfinder ECFs, with average fund sizes of £35m, are inadequate 
(Technopolis study of European VC in 2010 suggests a minimum fund size of £40m) 
One way around this is to enable second funds within a five year cycle (Lerner and 
Hall, 2005) and another way is to expand the original fund size, which is effectively 
what the new EU state regulations applying to ECFs has done, post January 2014, in 
doubling their potential scale (UK government ceiling raised to £50m per fund) 
raising the initial portfolio business ceiling to £5m and their follow-on funding ceiling 
to £12m.  
 
Consideration also has to be given to the ability to fund plum performing portfolio 
businesses (Wiltbank, 2005) through stage development (Cumming, 2011) to optimal 
exit (Markowitz, 1952), within an era of lengthening exit timescales and uncertain 
exit markets, typically via trade sales or IPOs. Apart from increasing fund sizes to 
accommodate this, there was a consensus amongst industry experts (notably trade 
associations like UKBAA and BVCA) and fund managers that there is a need for VC 
funds and business angels to take a far more proactive strategic view of follow-on 
funding and exit strategies from the outset of investments. This suggests the need for 
planned follow-on funding strategies such as the ACF’s pound for pound approach to 
initial and follow-on funding allocation and increased VC and angel syndication 
linkages, as exemplified in the good practice activities of ECFs like Passion Capital 
seed fund and UKIIF’s DFJ Esprit fund (Baldock and Mason, 2015; Hopp, 2010). 
There is also a need to consider whether the ECF time limited extension to 12 years 
will be sufficient and over time we will discover whether the UKIIF extended 
timeline of 15 years is sufficient for longer horizon sector investment. A potential 
solution to this is the timely development of second funds, if early enforced exit sales 
are to be avoided, which inevitably result in fund under performance and potential 
loss of IP and jobs to overseas trade buyers. Interestingly, findings from the more 
recent study of ECFs (Baldock, 2016) tend to support Lerner’s global view of 
GVCFs, in that whilst trade sales might result in overseas company takeovers, core 
R&D jobs can remain in the UK and the management skills and private proceeds of 
the trade sales are often redeployed and invested within the UK. Ultimately, however, 
as Rigos (2010) argues, optimal business exit, which can include IPO (Baldock, 
2015), can potentially lead to £100m, 100 employee size businesses being created and 
remaining head quartered in the UK, with the resultant spillover and ongoing 
economic impacts that can really make a difference. This can include the 





Government participation in venture capital schemes and programmes is an 
increasingly prevalent model of private equity provision, and well established in most 
developed economies. Notwithstanding significant investment of public resources in 
equity provision to private enterprises, there is a paucity of research on salient aspects 
of government participation in venture capital schemes. We address financing gaps, 
additionality, crowding out, economic impact and long term viability by investigating 
three UK investment funds, the Enterprise Capital Funds (ECF), the UK Innovation 
Investment Fund (UKIIF), and Angel Co-investment Fund (ACF). Our findings in 
relation to these issues reveal nuances according to each market and situation, which 
are accentuated in the post GFC funding environment. For example, our finding that 
project additionality is relatively greater than financial additionality over similar time 
and size scales suggests that traditional conceptions and assumptions about crowding 
out are overly simplistic, and that GVC schemes enable firms to respond to 
investment opportunities faster than they would otherwise. This is particularly 
important in the post GFC environment, given the significantly altered funding 
landscape. Similarly, we find that the ‘financing gap’ addressed is not standardised 
but varies according to requirements and preferences of entrepreneurs. Each scheme is 
tailored to provide investment for a different type of ‘funding gap’. In this context, it 
is interesting to observe that GVC schemes have evolved and adapted to address the 
many and various requirements of early stage ventures. 
 
Our findings reveal a number of areas of concern for policy makers, both in the UK 
and at regional (European) level. In addressing scheme design, policy makers should 
consider whether funding ceilings are significantly high to adequately serve the 
market, and more importantly enable greater scale by facilitating second funds within 
a limited time cycle. Investors and policy makers need to ensure early exit sales are 
avoided. This will involve ensuring sufficient liquidity in exit markets by developing 
follow-on funding, and extending the timeline to exit, particularly for ECFs. To 
achieve this, schemes require greater inbuilt flexibility along with more developed 
exit strategies.  
 
Our study reveals important conceptual issues related to the provision of GVC in the 
post GFC funding environment. Future researchers should broaden this study to 
include a representative sample of GVC schemes, and conduct a comparative study 
with other co-investment and VC schemes. This will facilitate a more comprehensive 
assessment of the effectiveness of GVC, including economic impact. By conducting 
this analysis across economic cycles, we will gain a greater understanding of how 
GVC schemes can be better designed to respond to temporal changes in the supply of 
private equity. Future studies should also address perennial issues such as ‘financing 
gaps’, ‘market failure’, and ‘crowding out’ to include more comprehensive criteria 
other than financial or economic measures. A more holistic, nuanced approach to 
investigating these issues will provide a greater understanding of early stage 
entrepreneurial process, and will ultimately provide us with a greater understanding of 
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Table 1: Summary of key trends underlying the evolving UK Finance Escalator 
 
1. Banks retreated to a ‘new norm’ of not providing equity finance under loan terms and 
conditions and, therefore, not funding early stage businesses with less than two year 
trading records (Davis, 2011).  
2. Private VCs continued to retreat from early stage investment, a trend traceable to the 
Dot.com collapse (Wiltbank, 2009) and evidenced by Murray (2007) and Mason and 
Pierrakis (2013).  
3. A much tougher post-GFC investment exit market for trade sales and IPOs (given the 
illiquidity of the UK AIM25 public feeder market for small cap firms, Baldock, 2015) led 
to the extension of investment horizons (Mason et al., 2010; CfEL, 2013).  
4. This led to the locking-in of angel and VC funds as investors were forced to maintain 
and continue to finance those companies in their portfolios that were unable to exit26 
(or abort and lose investments).  
5. Whilst angel capital groups have formed and moved upstream with larger size deals 
(GLA, 2013; UKBAA, 2013), the introduction of the Seed Enterprise Investment 
Scheme (SEIS) investor tax incentives in 201227 revitalised the seed investment 
market, encouraging private seed VCs, emerging crowd equity (Seedrs, Crowdcube) 
and business angel activity, notably in London’s Tech City (Baldock and Mason, 
2015; UKBAA, 2015).  
6. The exacerbation of the ‘Rowlands gap’ (Rowlands, 2009; SQW, 2009) for patient 
capital. Recent evidence from Baldock et al. (2015) found two persistent gaps for 
longer horizon (R&D taking 5 years plus to reach market) early and growth stage 
finance (particularly in the 2-5 year trading stage): first, the classic £200,000 to £2m 
gap which the UK’s ECF and  ACF are seeking to address and the second is the 
‘series A-B time-bomb’ where larger scale £2 to £10m plus finance is required for 
relatively young pre-trading or early trading businesses with under the £5m annual 
sales turnover qualification for the Business Growth Fund (BGF)28. This has been 
addressed in part in the UK by UKIIF (which is key long horizon sector restricted) and 
potentially by the ACF’s and enhanced ECF’s29 ability to provide follow-on funding. 
 
 
                                                 
25 The UK Alternative Investment Market (AIM) for small cap firms, typically with less than £100m 
asset base.  
26 More recently the UK exit markets have improved, with AIM becoming more liquid and attractive in 
2014 (Baldock, 2015). 
27 SEIS applies to investments into UK based companies with under 25 employees and up to £200,000 
in assets with a maximum company allowance of £150,000 per annum and individual investment 
allowance of £100,000 per annum. Offering a maximum of 50% Income Tax relief and Capital Gains 
Tax exemption if shares are held for at least 3 years (HMRC, 22/10/2013) 
28 The Business Growth Fund (BGF) was established in 2011 by five major UK banks to fund 
businesses with annual sales turnover of between £10m-£500m with between £2m-£10m. The initial 
threshold was subsequently lowered to £5m. 
29 UK state aid limits were raised in January 2014 from £2m initial investment in portfolio companies 
to £5m, with total funding raised from 10% of fund limit (typically £3m) to £12m; representing an 
upper cap of 15% of enlarged funds, which are likely to at least double, with the doubling of the public 
fund contribution cap to £50m and a minimum match of one third private funds. 
Table 2: Profile comparison between UK GVCs studied 
Enterprise Capital Funds (ECFs) 
Established: 2006 
UK Government funding contribution: 2006: £240m; 2010: £200m; 2014: £400m. 
Fund matching restrictions: at least one third contribution from private VC that manages the 
investments; maximum government funding of £25m, increased to £50m in 2014; maximum 
single firm initial investment £2m or 10% of total fund value with follow-on funding, increased 
to £5m initial funding and 15% of total fund value or £12m cap if follow-on funded. 
Investor matching criteria: private investor upside with 3% public sector profit cap. 
Aims:  
To fund potential high growth businesses in the seed, early stage and early growth stages; to 
provide demonstration effect to encourage early stage VC market development.   
Status: Open for investments with rolling 10 years funds. 
 
UK Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF) 
Established: 2009 
UK Government funding contribution: £150m with additional £150m of European Investment 
Fund (EIF) and £30m of private VC investment. Umbrella fund of funds structure leading to 
further private funding leverage of specialist sector funds that select and manage portfolio 
company investment. Ability to invest substantially over the £2m EU state aid limit (prior to 
2014) into individual companies.  
Investor matching criteria: pari passu. 
Aims: 
To provide substantial early and growth stage funding to key long horizon sectors: low carbon 
cleantech (green energy and recycling), advanced manufacturing, life science and digital 
technologies; pan European funds with global investment ability, enabling viable niche sector 
fund development and international syndication, required to invest at least the minimum UK 
government share of funds into UK based companies  
Status: Closed, fully funded 12-15 year life cycle funds 
 
Angel Co-investment Fund (ACF) 
Established: 2011 
UK government funding contribution: 2011: £50m; 2013: £50m top-up. 
Administered by the British Business Bank, investments are selected by an independent 
Investment Committee, providing up to 49% match funding, ranging from £100,000 to £1m 
with angel syndicates with a minimum of three investors. For every £1 invested, £1 is held 
back for follow-on funding provision.  
Investor matching criteria: pari passu 
Aims: 
To provide gap funding to potential high growth seed and early stage businesses through 
stretch funding angel syndicate investment and enabling follow-on funding rounds; 
encouraging angel group syndicate investing (minimum 3 members) and raising the standard 
of angel due diligence and investment practices. 
Status: Evergreen through ongoing fund recycling  
 
Note: Qualifying SMEs have under 250 employees, €50m annual sales turnover and €43m of 
assets on their balance sheet. 
Table 3 Business interviews by GVCF 
Programme Successful  recipients 
% of business investments* 
(n=) 
ECF 12 21% (57) 
UKIIF 16 41% (39) 
ACF 15 38% (39) 
Total 43 32% (135) 
Note: *At the time of survey: ECF initial survey 2010; UKIIF initial survey 2012; ACF single 
survey February 2014. 
  
 
Table 4 Breakdown of fund manager and investor interviews 
Fund Location 
Enterprise Capital Funds (ECFs): 
The Catapult Growth Fund (ECF) 
IQ Capital Fund 
Oxford Technology 
Seraphim Capital Fund 
Sustainable Technology Partnership 













UK Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF): 
Hermes GPE Environmental Innovation Fund. 
European Investment Fund UK Future 
Technologies Funds. 
Underlying funds: 
Zouk Cleantech II. 
Scottish Equity Partners Environmental Energies. 
WHEB Ventures. 
DFJ Esprit. 
Advent Life Sciences. 
Gilde Healthcare III. 
 
Fund of funds manager, London. 
Fund of funds manager, Luxembourg. 
 
Hermes fund, London. 
Hermes fund, Glasgow and London. 
Hermes fund, London. 
EIF UKFTF fund, London and 
Cambridge. 
EIF UKFTF fund, London. 
EIF UKFTF fund, Utrecht and Cambridge 
USA. 
 
Angel Co-Investment Fund (ACF): 
19 Lead business angel investors from investment 
syndicates, of which 16 had been successful and 
five had been unsuccessful. 
3 (of the 10) Investment Committee (IC) 




10 angel groups, 5 in London, 2 in South 
East, 1 East Midlands, 1 in South West 
England and 1 in Scotland. 
UK-wide representation. 
Alternative Investors and Experts 
13 alternative private investors: Private VCs (4) 
and seed VCs (3), Venture Capital Trusts (3) 
Angel Capital Groups (3) 
6 industry stakeholders and experts: British 
Venture Capital Association (BVCA), UK Business 
Angels Association (UKBAA), Angel News, St 
John’s Innovation Centre, European Investment 
Fund (EIF), Professor Dylan Jones-Evans 
(Finance Wales reviewer) 
 
 
8 in London, 1 North East, 1 Yorkshire 





Table 5 Funding and Project Additionality:  Ability of recipient businesses to raise 
finance from elsewhere without government VC funding and undertake the proposed 
business project 
 
Funding: ECF UKIIF ACF 
definitely would not have raised 
finance from other sources 
2 (16%) 1 (6%) 2 (15%) 
probably would not have raised 
finance from other sources 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (7%) 
no strong opinion 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
probably would have raised 
finance from other sources 
5 (42%) 4 (25%) 6 (39%) 
definitely would have raised 
finance from other sources 
5 (42%) 11 (69%) 6 (39%) 
Total recipient businesses 12 (100%) 16 (100%) 15 (100%) 
Project:    
would not have gone ahead at 
all, in any format 
5 (42%) 1 (6%) 3 (22%) 
would have gone ahead at the 
same time, but on a smaller 
scale  
0 (0%) 5 (31%) 4 (24%) 
would have taken longer to go 
ahead, but at the original 
planned scale 
2 (16%) 3 (19%) 2 (15%) 
would have taken longer to go 
ahead and on a smaller scale 
2 (16%) 4 (24%) 2 (15%) 
would have gone ahead at the 
same time and at the same 
scale 
3 (26%) 3 (19%) 4 (24%) 
Total recipient businesses 12 (100%) 16 (100%) 15 (100%) 
 
Table 6: Scheme Impact and Forecast Measures 
 
Total Employment ECF  UKIIF  ACF  
 N= median mean N= median mean N= median mean 
Time of funding 12 4 9.5 16 11 38 10 5 11 
1 year after funding* 12 10 12.9 16 20 58.4 10 7.5 22 
2 years after funding*** - - - 14 35 69.1 14 14 29 
3 years after funding** - - - 14 60 84 - - - 
4 years after 
funding**** 7 26 25.7 - - - 14 25 46 
5 years after funding** 7 30 29.4 - - - - - - 
 
Annual Sales Turnover (£m) 
Time of funding 12 0 0.56 16 0 6.2 10 0.2 0.41 
1 year after funding* 12 0 0.7 16 1.3 10 10 0.3 0.65 
2 years after funding*** 12 0.6 - 14 1.5 14.3 14 1.13 1.84 
3 years after funding** - - - 14 3.25 18.9 - - - 
4 years after 
funding**** 7 0.38 1.62 - - - 14 6.25 10.17 
5 years after funding** 7 1.2 2.17 - - - - - - 
Notes: 
* ECF surveyed February 2010, UKIIF surveyed February 2012, ACF surveyed February 
2013. 
**Year 3 is the next year forecast for UKIIF. 
**Year 5 is the next year forecast for ECF 
***Year 2 is the first year predictor for ECF and ACF 
****Year 4 is the three year predictor for ACF 
 
Table 7:  business performance, time and type of investment exit expected 
Performance 
Year 1 All* 
(Column %) 
Year 2 UKIIF 
(Column %) 
Year 4 ECF 
(Column %) 
Better 33% 29% 0% 
Same 48% 43% 40% 
Worse 19% 28% 60% 
Time to Exit    
Median 5 yrs 5 yrs 6.5 yrs 
Range 2‒7yrs 2‒7 yrs 4‒10 yrs 
Longer n/a 29% 80% 
Same n/a 64% 20% 
Shorter n/a 7% 0% 
Type of Exit    
Trade Sale 67% 72% 80% 
IPO 25% 21% 10% 
Other 8% 7% 10% 
N= 21 14 7 
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